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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this 
case pursuant to Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme 
Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment granted 
against Plaintiff and for Defendants by the Honorable 
Douglas L. Cornaby of the Second Judicial District Court 
of Davis County, State of Utah, in Civil No. 45208. The 
Amended Order, Judgment, and Decree were entered on July 
16, 1990. THe Amended Notice of Appeal was filed on July 
20, 1990. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Defendants fully performed their contract with 
Plaintiff and paid all sums due and owing under the terms 
thereof. 
2. The Court did not err in failing to grant 
Plaintiff equitable relief on the grounds of mutual 
mistake. 
3. The Plaintiff, by agreement on a full and final 
settlement at closing, and by executing waivers of lien, 
waived any right to claim any subsequent lien on 
Defendants' property. 
4. The Plaintiff, by agreeing on a full and final 
settlement at closing, and by executing waivers of lien, 
is estopped from claiming any subsequent lien on 
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Defendants' property. 
5. The Court did not err in dismissing Plaintiff's 
claims under the bonding statute and quantum merit. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellees' argument is summarized as follows: 
1. The terms of the contract are plain and, 
pursuant to thereto, Plaintiff was paid in full for all 
labor, materials, and performance thereunder, as agreed 
at the closing. 
2. There was no mutual mistake of the parties 
entitling Plaintiff to equitable relief. 
3. By entering into a written agreement and lien 
waivers at the closing, Plaintiff waived any right to 
claim a subsequent lien on Defendants' property. 
4. The Court's order regarding the contract 
performance and waiver is dispositive of Plaintiff's 
entire case. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On July 12, 1988, Defendants Scott G. Campbell 
and Claudia Campbell entered into a construction contract 
with Plaintiff Niederhauser, wherein the Plaintiff agreed 
to build a home for Defendants for the sum of $87,700.00. 
(R. 53). 
2. The agreement between the parties was for the 
fixed sum of $87,700.00, and was not a "cost-plus" 
contract. Article Three thereof (R. 53) stated that 
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"Authorized change orders will be submitted by the 
contractor for all work not specifically included in the 
contract." Defendants never authorized any change in the 
contract amount due prior to such expenditures being 
incurred by Plaintiff, nor did Defendants authorize or 
sign any written change orders for work not included in 
the contract price prior to the loan closing date. (R. 
76) . 
3. In conjunction with the referenced building 
contract, the parties obtained interim financing in the 
form of a construction loan from First Security Bank of 
Utah, Layton Branch. A General Security and Pledge 
Agreement for said loan was signed by the parties on July 
7, 1988. (R. 54). 
4. The bank made disbursements directly to the 
Plaintiff and to various subcontractors and materialmen 
as work on the home progressed. Each time a disbursement 
was made, a waiver of lien and endorsement placed on the 
back of the check was signed by the payee. (R. 76). The 
lien waiver and endorsement on each check issued was 
identical and copies of the lien waiver, taken from the 
last three checks issued on the loan were attached to 
Defendants' Motion. (R. 56). 
5. After the home was fully constructed, on 
December 30, 1988, the final closing was held at the 
offices of Associated Title Company, Bountiful, Utah, 
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with all parties present, including bank officials, where 
the following occurred, among other things: 
(a) A final Settlement Statement was agreed 
upon and executed between Plaintiff and Defendants, 
which included a major increase in the price of the 
home. (R. 57, 58). 
(b) A full and final payment was made to and 
accepted by Plaintiff in the sum of $10,204.24, in 
the form of a check marked "payment in full" (R. 
59, 60), containing a waiver of lien. 
(c) A full and final payment was made to the 
bank in the sum of $109,644.96, representing a 
total payoff of the construction loan. (R. 61, 
62). 
(d) Both parties signed an agreement at the 
closing stating that the only incomplete item on 
the home was plastering the foundation and the only 
monies left to be paid were for that purpose. This 
agreement authorized $300.00 to be held by the bank 
and disbursed upon completion of the plastering. 
No other work was to be done or payments to be 
made. (R. 63, 76). 
(e) A full reconveyance of the construction 
loan Deed of Trust was executed, reflecting that 
the construction loan had been fully paid. (R. 
64). 
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(f) Defendants obtained at the closing a new 
long-term financing loan in the sum of $112,500.00, 
secured by a Deed of Trust. (R. 65-70). 
6. On or about February 18, 1989, about 2-1/2 
months after the closing date, Defendants were contacted 
by Plaintiff's attorney and advised that they owed an 
additional $5,319.62 to the Plaintiff, for construction 
of their home, due to a "mixup between First Security 
Bank and Niederhauser Builders". Defendants were 
threatened that unless this sum was paid immediately, 
Plaintiff would place a lien on Defendants' home. (R. 
71). 
7. On March 7, 1989, Plaintiff filed a Notice of 
Lien, on Defendants' home, with the Davis County 
Recorder's Office. (R. 73). 
8. On March 30, 1989, Defendants gave notice to 
Plaintiff that the aforesaid lien was legally improper 
and demanded its removal forthwith. (R. 75). The lien 
has not been removed to date. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANTS FULLY PERFORMED THEIR CONTRACT AND PAID 
ALL SUMS DDE AND OWING UNDER THE TERMS THEREOF. 
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the Defendants 
fully performed and paid all sums due under the contract. 
That full performance was the primary basis of the lower 
court's ruling. 
The contract between the parties was for the 
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initial sum of $87,700.00/ a fixed sum. The contract 
further provided that "authorized" change orders were to 
be submitted by the contractor for all work not 
specifically included in the contract. (Article 3, R. 
53). The contract further provided that any costs due to 
an increase in the size of the home would be treated as 
an extra "and would be settled between the owner and 
builder at closing". (Article 6, R. 53). The contract 
also stated that any and all other costs, i.e., 
construction loan costs, service charges, interest, 
points, etc., would be the responsibility of owner, and 
would be settled at closing. 
The contract was not a cost plus contract, where 
the builder would be allowed charges for every item of 
labor or material, plus a percentage. If it had been, 
his claims for additional charges subsequent to closing 
would have more substance. Instead, the contract was for 
a sum certain, to be finalized at closing. 
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, the closing 
was held on December 30, 1988. The closing documents 
clearly specify that the parties did then and there agree 
to an adjusted sales price of $125,214.00, and the 
Plaintiff was paid in full. The Plaintiff accepted this 
sum as full payment, signed all of the closing documents, 
and in consideration therefore, executed all lien waivers 
and releases. (R. 56-70). The lower court made clear in 
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its ruling the exact terms of the contract, and all facts 
in evidence showing its payment in full and complete 
satisfaction by Defendants. (See. lower court's "Ruling 
on Motions", paragraphs 2-5; R. 154-156). 
Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the court 
clearly ruled on the contract issue, holding that 
Plaintiff was paid in full and there was no breach of 
contract by Defendants. 
II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO GRANT PLAINTIFF 
EQUITABLE RELIEF ON GROUNDS OF MUTUAL MISTAKE. 
The following undisputed facts are relevant in an 
analysis of the elements of mutual mistake, as they 
relate to this case. 
1. The construction contract executed between the 
parties on July 12, 1988, contained the following 
provisions: 
(a) Construction cost of $87,700.00; with 
authorized change orders to be approved by 
Defendants for all work not included in the 
contract. 
(b) Increased size of the home, loan costs, 
service change, points, etc. all to be settled 
between owner and builder at the time of closing. 
2. No representations are made by either party 
that the contract itself contains any mistakes rendering 
it at variance with the prior understanding and agreement 
of the parties. The contract is clear and unambiguous. 
3. The closing was held on December 30, 1988 with 
the Plaintiff and Defendants, and representatives of the 
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bank and title company in attendance. Even though no 
pre-approved written change orders had been submitted by 
the Plaintiff, such change orders were submitted at 
closing and accepted by Defendants, which caused a major 
increase in the total payoff to the sum of $ 125,214.00. 
At closing, all final closing documents were agreed upon 
and signed by the parties. It was fully agreed that 
payment in full had been made and accepted by Plaintiff. 
4. Plaintiff then advised Defendants, on or about 
February 18, 1989, that they owed an additional 
$5 , 319 . 6 2 , due to a "mistake" made by Plaintiff. 
Actually, a "mixup" between Niederhauser Builders and 
First Security Bank, relating to Plaintiff's construction 
loan. Plaintiff admitted that it first discovered this 
mistake on approximately January 6, 1989. (R. 158). 
5. It is undisputed that Defendants had no 
knowledge of Plaintiff's mistake until February 18, 1989. 
The nature of the mistake was such that Defendants had no 
reason to know of it, as they were not privy to the 
Plaintiff's dealings with his own bank. Likewise, it is 
undisputed that the mistake was not produced by fraud or 
any other conduct of Defendants. 
The issue then becomes whether or not this 
"mistake" made by the Plaintiff provides a basis for 
reformation or rescission on the contract. 
1. A party to a contract cannot avoid it on the 
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ground that he made a mistake where there has been no 
misrepresentation, there is no ambiguity in the terms of 
the contract, and the other party has no notice of such 
mistake and acts in good faith. 
The general rule has been that a unilateral mistake 
provides no basis for relief. This has been stated as 
the rule in Utah on numerous occasions. Star lev v. 
Deseret Foods Corp., 93 Utah 577, 586, 74 P.2d 1221, 1225 
(1938); Ashworth v. Charlesworth, 119 Utah 650, 231 p.2d 
324 (1951); Bown v. Loveland, 678 P.2d 292 (Utah 1984). 
The more current view, however, is that even a 
unilateral mistake may be sufficient to avoid a contract, 
if certain elements are present. This is the position 
now taken by the Utah Supreme Court in the recent case of 
Guardian State Bank v. Stand, 778 P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). 
Here, the Court indicated that even a unilateral mistake 
can provide a basis for relief under the following 
conditions: 
When one party's mistake of fact is coupled 
with knowledge of the mistake by the other 
party or a mistake is produced by fraud or 
other inequitable conduct by the nonerring 
party, the mistake provides a basis for 
reformation or rescission. (p. 5). 
In the instant case, the mistake was not caused by 
Defendants, either purposefully or innocently, and it was 
not even known by them for weeks after the closing. The 
above elements are clearly not met in the instant case. 
Stancrl further holds that a mistake in the 
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recordation or memorialization of an agreement may not be 
exploited by one party to take advantage of the other. 
That was certainly not the facts in the instant case. It 
is clear that even under the more liberal and modern test 
as outlined in the Stangl case, the Plaintiff's one-sided 
and belated "mistake", is not sufficient to allow 
rescission or reformation of the contract herein. 
2. There can be no mutual mistake as to an event 
that is to occur in the future. 
In Mooney v. G R & Associates, 746 P.2d 1174 (Utah 
App. 1987), the maker of a note tried to argue that the 
failure to record a security interest in the note, as had 
been agreed by the parties, was a mutual mistake of fact 
which made the note voidable. The court held that the 
escrow agent's failure to record the security interest 
was a fact which did not exist at the time the parties 
entered into the agreement, and thus was not a mutual 
mistake of a material fact. The court quoted the 
Colorado Supreme Court when it stated that: 
A party may rescind a contract when, at the 
time the contract is made, the parties make a 
mutual mistake about a material fact, the 
existence of which is a basic assumption of the 
contract. If the parties harbor only mistaken 
expectations as to the course of the future 
events and their assumptions as to facts 
existing at the time of the contract are 
correct, rescission is not proper. This rule 
is justified by the reality that parties to 
commercial contracts rarely predict future 
events with total accuracy. Indeed, a contract 
often functions primarily to insulate the 
parties from uncertainty and to alleviate the 
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risk of future events. (p. 1178). 
In the instant case, the event which caused the 
alleged material mistake of fact was a mistake made by 
the bank and the Plaintiff in recording; a fact which did 
not exist at the time the parties entered into the 
Agreement, and which could not have been known until some 
time after the contract had been executed. While this is 
a failure of expectation, it is not a mutual mistake of a 
material fact. 
III. THE PLAINTIFF, BY AGREEMENT ON A FULL AND FINAL 
SETTLEMENT AT CLOSING, AND BY EXECUTING WAIVERS OF 
LIEN, WAIVED ANY RIGHT TO CLAIM A SUBSEQUENT LIEN 
ON DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY. 
As argued above, the construction loan was paid off 
in full at closing in the sum of $109,644.96. All checks 
endorsed by Plaintiff contained the lien waiver. The 
last such waiver was signed by Plaintiff on January 6, 
1989/ containing the following language: 
Lien Waiver 
In consideration of the payment of this check, 
the payee by endorsing, causing to be endorsed, 
stamping this check with . . . waivers, 
releases, and relinquishes all right of lien or 
claims payee now has to date upon the premises 
Payee warrants and guarantees under 
penalty of fraud that payment in full has been 
made by payee to all laborers and suppliers of 
labor and all materials to said premises 
incurred to date at the instance of payee . . . 
(Emphasis added). 
This waiver is clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal 
in the following: 
1. Waiving and releasing all liens and claims 
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Plaintiff had to date on the premises. 
2. Warranting and guaranteeing that all payments 
were made to all laborers and suppliers incurred to date 
on the premises. 
The waiver clearly not only applies to that check 
only, but to all labor and material incurred to date. 
That waiver, coupled with the full accord and 
satisfaction of a payment in full at closing, and a full 
payoff and reconveyance of the Deed of Trust on the 
construction loan, precludes Plaintiff from turning right 
around and liening Defendants' property. 
In Holbrook v. Websters, Inc., 320 P.2d 661 (1958), 
one of the major issues was whether Webster, Inc. waived 
and released its lien and any right to lien which it 
acquired. 
The appellant had executed a lien waiver which: 
[hjereby waives, releases, and discharges any 
lien or right to lien the undersigned has or 
may hereafter acquire against said real 
property. (p. 663) 
Webster claimed he only intended to release the property 
insofar as the receipted amount was concerned. The court 
held that the lien release was supported by valuable 
consideration, was unambiguous, and was effective for the 
purpose of releasing such lien. 
The release is susceptible of only one meaning 
and absent fraud cannot be varied except by 
agreement of the parties. (p. 663). 
In Le Grand Johnson Construction Co. v. Kennedy, 
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541 P.2d 1038 (1975), the Utah Supreme Court upheld such 
lien waivers even when they were not completely filled in 
and the contractor was given authority to complete them, 
and they were for the purpose of releasing any claim of 
lien by the plaintiff on the construction of the home of 
the defendants. (p. 1039). 
The Utah case of Zions First National Bank v. 
Saxton, 27 Utah 2d 76, 493 P.2d 62 (1972) is a case with 
very similar facts to the instant case. In Saxton, the 
defendant did construction work on a trailer park on a 
construction loan with plaintiff bank. After receiving 
money from the loan, defendant endorsed the checks and 
signed lien waivers with the endorsement. Subsequently, 
defendant filed a new lien claiming that unknown to the 
bank some of the work had been done on land which was not 
part of the original tract on which the trailer park was 
built. 
The court, applying the guidelines in Holbrook v. 
Webster. Inc., held that defendant had no right to lien 
on the tract of land and it mattered not that some of the 
work was performed on land not a part of the original 
tract. 
In the instant case, it matters not that the bank 
made a mistake as to work performed. The waiver, plus 
the agreed to acceptance of the sum specified in closing 
were final and Plaintiff had no right to place a 
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subsequent lien on the same property. When the final 
payments were made to the Plaintiff at closing, the 
construction loan Deed of Trust was paid off and a 
reconveyance was executed with no reservations. 
In First of Denver Mortgage Investors v. Zundel & 
Associates, 600 P.2d 521 (Utah 1979) one of the issues 
involved the effect of the builder executing a release of 
lien. The lien waiver contained language practically 
identical with that in the instant case. After 
discussing the law allowing valid lien waivers, the Court 
quoting an Illinois case stated the following rule: 
While a waiver of lien for a clearly expressed 
special purpose will be confined by the courts 
to the purpose intended, yet, where a general 
waiver is executed, and there is nothing in the 
context to show a contrary intention, there is 
nothing left for the court to do but enforce 
the contract as the parties have made it. 
. . . Child Bros received cash and property in 
exchange for the release. It release of lien 
rights is therefore binding as to those rights 
accrued up to the time of the release, at least 
as to it. (p. 527). 
Courts have further held that when such lien 
waivers are executed, supported by consideration, unjust 
enrichment cannot be used as a basis to nullify the lien 
waiver. Western Federal Savings and Loan of Denver v. 
National Homes Corp., 445 P.2d 892 (1968) (p. 898). See 
also 27 Am* Jur. 550-51. 
IV. THE PLAINTIFF, BY AGREEING ON A FULL AND FINAL 
SETTLEMENT AT CLOSING, AND BY EXECUTING WAIVERS OF 
LIEN, IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING ANY SUBSEQUENT LIEN 
ON DEFENDANTS' PROPERTY. 
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In Phillips v, Gilbert, 101 U.S. 721, 25 L.Ed 833 
(1879), the United States Supreme Court held that a 
contractor who filed a lien upon real estate for work and 
materials furnished in constructing a home thereon, then 
releases his lien for the purpose of enabling the owner 
to secure a new loan, is estopped from afterwards 
claiming a lien against the party making the loan on the 
property. 
This position was reaffirmed in the Utah case of 
Koch v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc., 534 P.2d 403 (1975). 
As a consequence, the Plaintiff, after having been 
paid off in full at the closing, releasing his lien, and 
executing a reconveyance of the construction Dee of 
Trust, is estopped from asserting the disputed lien. 
V. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFF'S 
CLAIMS UNDER THE BONDING STATUTE AND QUANTUM MERUIT. 
1. Plaintiff's claim under the bonding statute, 
Utah Code Ann. Section 14-2-1 (1953 as amended). 
Plaintiff's cause of action under this statute is 
totally without merit. This statute requires the owner 
to obtain a bond from the contractor conditioned for the 
faithful performance of the contract and prompt payment 
for materials furnished and labor performed under the 
contract. Its purpose is aimed at those who furnish 
material and labor under the contract — the materialmen 
and subcontractors. to give them a right of action 
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against the sureties — in case they are not paid by the 
contractor. This cause of action is for the value of 
materials furnished or labor performed, not exceeding the 
price agreed upon. In the instant case, no subcontractor 
or materialman has made a claim; only the contractor 
himself has plead the bonding statute as a separate cause 
of action. Even if the statute were applicable to 
Plaintiff, as a contractor, it is an undisputed fact that 
Plaintiff was paid in full for the price agreed upon in 
the contract, and further that Plaintiff waived any other 
liens or rights against Defendants. He, therefore, has 
no cause under this statute for the additional sums over 
the agreed contract price, for which he seeks. 
In Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke,. 50 Utah 114, 167 
P.2d 241 (1917), the court stated the purpose of the 
bonding statute, holding, among other things, that under 
the statute, "only laborers and materialmen are afforded 
a statutory right of action against the surety" (p. 242). 
See also Ligness v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979) where 
the court stated: 
The purpose and object (of the statute) is for 
the protection of all parties concerned, except 
the original contractor, who, as experience has 
demonstrated, has less need of protection than 
anyone else concerned in the business. (p. 
808). 
The general contractor, of course, has the protection of 
the mechanic's lien statute against the property owner. 
In Cox Roch Products v. Walker Pipeline Constr., 757 P.2d 
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672 (Utah App. 1988), the court again held that the 
statute was enacted to protect suppliers and 
subcontractors. 
Utah Code Ann, Section 14-2-1 (1987) requires 
that property owners who contract in 
construction work exceeding $2,000.00 shall 
obtain from the general contractor a payment 
bond assuring subcontractors and suppliers will 
be paid even if the general contractor 
defaults. If the owner fails to require that 
such a bond be posted and the contractor 
defaults in paying subcontractors and 
suppliers, the latter have a right of action 
against the owner. (p. 674). (Emphasis 
added). 
The Court has also established the general rule 
that because of the common purpose of the liens and 
contractors bond statutes, and their practically 
identical language, adjudications as to what is lienable 
under the former are helpful in determining the proper 
application of the latter. Graco Fishing & Rental Tools, 
Inc. v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1078 
(Utah 1988); King Bros., Inc. v. Utah Dairy Kiln Co., 374 
P.2d 254, 255-256 (Utah 1962). 
The Court ruled properly as to the lien issue. 
Consistent with that ruling, the Plaintiff would not be 
entitled to relief under the bonding statute as a matter 
of law. 
2. Plaintiff's claim in Quantum Meruit. 
In his Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiff prays for 
compensation "in an amount equal to the reasonable value 
of the labor and materials provided by Plaintiff to the 
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Defendants". (R. 6). The contract between the parties, 
however# (which was drafted by the Plaintiff, was not a 
"cost plus" contract in which Defendants agreed just to 
pay costs of labor and materials. The facts are 
undisputed that Defendants paid all sums due and owing 
under the contract, as reflected in the final closing 
documents. In fact, the Plaintiff is demanding more in 
quantum meruit than he would be allowed under the 
contract. 
The language of the contract, being clear and 
unambiguous, specifies the legal rights and remedies of 
the parties. The Utah Supreme Court has held that where 
there is a legal remedy available to which resort may be 
had without any substantial or irreparable damage, one 
may not seek equity. Erisson v. Overman, 358 P.2d 85, 87 
(Utah 1961). Plaintiff's claim in quantum meruit is, 
therefore, without basis and properly denied by the lower 
court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's Ruling, Order, and Judgment 
properly encompass all issues in dispute in this case. 
There is no genuine issue of material fact, and 
Defendants are entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter 
of law. It is, therefore, respectfully requested that 
the Summary Judgment of the trial court be affirmed. 
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